The Universe as Metalogical and Non-Human. by McClelland, Hardin T.
THE UNIVERSE AS METALOGICAL AND NON-HUMAN
BY HARDIX T. McCLELLAND
UP to the end of the 18th Century the main concern of physical
science was with matter, the properties of matter and material
objects; the 19th Century discovered that energy had a hand in the
makeup and disposition of all things material ; and now the 20th
Century is adding new light to the whole range of material analysis,
even taking away the very foundation conceptions of mass, motion,
weight, buoyancy, solidity, etc. and translating these properties into
terms of electrical and radiological analysis. Einstein has disrupted
the whole field of physics by advancing hypotheses that gravitation
is a space relation rather than a property of matter, that light waves
are independent of the ethereal flow, and that motion and duration
are both relative in a universe where both space and time are curved.
Nowadays inertia is considered as potent a factor as energy, im-
material constituencies are as important as material groupings, and
the universe is seen to be self-perpetuating as a whole even the
undeniably dissipating and recrudescent in some particular (and
more or less "ponderable") features. Energy in the form of
motion is not nearly so problematic and incorrigible as energy in
the form of inertia, such for example as the inertia of gxratory
motion, the inertia of atomic structure and electronic poise, or the
relative inertia of radium and radioactive emanations. Inertia is
what gives any material body a center of gravity ; it is the name we
give to the locus of balanced forces, the perfect instance of inertia
being a perfect vacuum because it would be a perfect balance be-
tween the forces of compression on the outside and of repression or
resistance on the inside.
Among the chief concerns of philosophy too we find that tran-
scendentalism had been precocious ever since the naive scholastic
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speculations of Ansclni and Aquinas dispossessed the nominalists of
their assumptive treasures. Hut it actually came to the anticlimax
of its ambitious overreach at the end of the 18th Century when
Kant attempted to prescribe Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphyxic
by rehashing the old rationale of univcrsals into a new schematism
under the twelve categories of all possible human judgment. The
main transcendental assumptions of priority and identity still remain
unproven; we still wonder whether synthetic apriori judgments arc
grounds or subsequents to the categories of thought, and whether
there is actual identity or only practical similarity between ideas
and objects. We feel quite sure that the general peirastic stream is
somehow transcended in epistemology and metaphysical logic, but
how and in what degree of accuracy and authority we do not yet
understand. It is as yet even problematical just what precise virtue
there is in the modern reduction of philosophy to terms of linguistic
ftermutation and logical resynthesis under new abstracts of title.
We have, however, a vague but insistent notion that if the whole
universe of diction i< no more rational than a mere universe of
arbitrary novelty (and which therefore borders on that of mere
fiction) then the categories of thought as well as the postulates of
dative experience are not as aristocratic and necessitarian as we first
supposed, but as mere linguistic developments or accessories are
hardly any less groundless and unphilosophable than the jabber-
wocky of a bizarre rhetorical flourish.
Scientific logic is an illusion of our own categorical vision and
thought process if the universe of reality and fact cannot be amply
(which for philosophy means wholly) syllogized and all its functions
represented in symbolic procedure. But can it be syllogized and
forced to respond to our insistent deductions? This is no modern
problem because seventeen centuries ago Sextus Empiricus held
that it cannot and that no amount of intensive reasoning on our part
will reveal truths not already given in experience, whence if realitv
is not revealed thereby then logic cannot advance and enlarge but
can only analyze and regulate the knowledge and thinking process
we already possess. It is a modern problem tho when we ask why
a full and philosophical linguistic has to make room for all universes
of interest, diction, fiction and fact so far as they can be symbolically
represented, and must not make exclusive selection as to ad-
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missability of evidence on grounds merely of rational approach or
categorical invitation.
Radical and revolutionary hypotheses are in order today and we
can only consider all announced programs as merely tentative and
provisional until such time as they gradually eliminate each other,
or at least adjust themselves to what may some day prove really
intelligible and acceptable to a cosmic philosophy. The whole cate-
gory of expression is only one of the innumerable functions of
reality, and if we assume that the functions of reality are essentially
emergent and melioristic then we would also have to subsume that
our own functions of experience and thought (linguistic, ethic and
art) are similarly progressive and engaged in the intrinsic struggle
for wider scope and efifiiciency of expression. The whole upshot
being that in an era of existence so palpably imperfect and yet
equally determined on development and meliorism, the genetic
urgency and developmental transition should themselves be among
the chief factors qualifying whatever philosophy we might devise,
whether it emerged from below as a gradually expanding linguistic
of analytic and synthetic expression or from above as a gradual
metamorphosis out of the metalogical realm of transfinite categorical
contingency.
Evolutionary theory fairly well covers the first aspect of our
philosophical derivation, but as yet we have no very thoro advice
on whether the second asjject does not also have some element of
truth in it. It is at least significant to the situation that we are
asking what implications of philosophical validity, as distingushed
from logical validity, may be predicated of the transfinite, and
whether subsumptions under the postulate of a categorical absolute
are too finite and dependent upon human intellective ])atterns to
carr\- philosophicall}' competent judgments about realit\-. We
learned from Aristotle that the categories themselves fit our habits
of thought peculiarly well e\'en tho we do seek objectivity for them
by making them batten on the hypothesis of the universality of na-
tural law. But if all readings of natural law are functions of rela-
tion-value rather than of factual existence we are at full logical
liberty to assume also that the categories are not integers of judg-
ment but may in turn be disintegrated, analyzed, redistributed and
reconstituted in all the interchangeable terms of each other. .\nd
not only this, but such contingency and superordination might be
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listed as a new category by which we could determine new worlds of
thou^lit and issues of thought.
In this new field the Kantian categories of quantity, quality,
modahty and relation could each be so juggled (if not materially, at
least verbally) into interchangeable positions, and even the so-called
exclusiveness of sub-categorical declension would become a broken
barrier because all artificial disjunction would be put aside as being
irreplical of any real situation in reality. Hriefly, according to a
transfinite logistic nothing is strictly categorical in the accepted
rational sense because all distinctions arising from time-and-space
postulates of the extensive and intensive, the potential and actual,
the substantial and attributive, the causal and etTectual, would vanish
or at least be reduced to mere "formal unities" peculiar to our own
intellectual pattern of rational integrity. What we call categorical
necessity arises from the acce])tance of this human integrity which is
both empirical in source and rational in expression, but whenever
we allow the metalogical possibility that the categories may be
functionally contingent among themselves even tho we do assume
metaphvsically that natural law is universal, we are then in a position
to transcend the whole categorical viewpoint were it only sufficiently
stable and secure for the moment that we postulated a new category
of the super-categorical order. Such speculations as this involve
large interest in whether reality is nomological in absolute fact as
well as relative value, and we will perhaps never become impersonal-
minded or philosophically competent enough to solve the question
whether the apparent antinomy between category and contingency
is a real anomaly of human thought or merely a verbal conflict
caused by assuming that the full exercize of philosophy is transfinite.
The human mind is finite and hence can only take hold of reality
piecemeal, divisively ; and in the fragmentary metaphysical con-
sciousness no full insight into or report of the total nature of abso-
lute reality can be made. I'.ut if we discard the phenomenologi, and
automorphism peculiar to the finite mind and consider reality in the
light of the few fundamental properties we know that it possesses
independently of our own individual viewpoint, we can assay some
measure of accuracy and success in analyzing and understanding its
general nature and significance. The finite and ephemeral mode
or phase cannot cover or reach all parts of the infinite and eternal,
nor can the scope of function or skill open to the one cover all the
562 THE OPEN COURT
degrees or differentia possible in the other. This does not exactly
bolster the negative epistemology indicated in the part-and-whole
argument of agnosticism, but it does keep our philosophies humble
and our ethics conservative because it reminds us that any part of
reality has to be similarly harmonious, coherent, spontaneous and
melioristic with the whole, whence whatever a finite mind might
read in a single isolated fragment (as any particular empirical mo-
ment might give) would be limited, divisive or differentiated only
in appearance and not in any substantial relation or essential refer-
ence to reality. We do not even know for sure that our own ex-
perience is fragmentary or confluent. We only seize certain mo-
ments here and there and arbitrarily give them representative power
and denotative importance. If reality is supra-relational then it is
not a predicable but an absolute, and any fragmentariness as of
parts or relations are only appearances in the phantasmagoria of
finite minds. No amount of logical transmutation or metaphysical
supplementation will enable a figment of the finite mind to take on
the dignity or enjoy the non-human prerogatives of what is already
an eternal and complete whole.
These latter items should have a more appropriate treatment in
a theory of magnitude which mathematicians consider dual in
nature. It may be continuous as in fluxions or geometrical calcula-
tions, or it may be discrete as in the differential calculus or arith-
metical analysis, but it is nowadays a shrewd mathematician who
knows his own magnitudes, whether they are continuous, trans-
finite, functional or infinitesimal. The analysis of intensive magni-
tudes is more fertile and significant to philosophy than the analysis
of extensi\e magnitudes because whole universes of discourse and
predication are opened up by turning our inquisitive apparatus
into an instrument of self-examination and logistic control. It is
here that we find many positive reminders that realit}- includes many
phases of characteristic order not determinable under logic or dic-
tion, but merely indicated as residual margins adjoining but not
covered by our present philosophical categories. They exist in the
universe of interest long before the\- can ever be pro\en to actually
exist in the universe of fact.
Whereas the extensive quantity is either continuous or discrete
in temporal or spacial relation of part to part, part to whole, or
whole to whole, an intensive (iuantit\- (([uality, to be more exact)
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is either continuous or discrete in functional or modal relation be-
cause whenever we hepin to syllof^izc the universe into quantified re-
lations or predications we also bcpin breaking it up into such par-
ticular phases and types of order as will fit our conscious mental
moods. These moods in turn may be classifiable into the four
principal avenues of interest or thought, viz: objective extension,
subjective intension, substantive being (or factual existence), and
predicative relation (even the logical categories become merely so
manv predicative relations between thoughts and things in the uni-
verse of metapliNsical and metalogical interest). Each of these in-
tellectual avenues may be further quantitied as being continuous or
discrete and qualified as being empirical or rational, realistic or
idealistic, substantial or adjectival, naturalistic or religio-spiritual
:
so that the full cycle of function would correspond to a system of
serial inclusions rather than an actually discrete hcterogeny of
clashing incompatibles. \'alues ami concepts, principles and laws,
origins and destinies, having both transitive and permanent (that
is human and non-human") significance arise from having their bases
in the strictly inclusive metalogical system rather than in the
alogical, illogical, prelogical, paralogical or dyslogistic limbo of
incoherence.
In distinction from our philosophy in the present situation our
scientific achievement has taken tangible and somewhat firmer hold
on what seems to us is the intelligibiilty of the Cosmos because it
has been fortunate (or specialistic) enough to consider only the
empirical aspect of reality. Science operates on the cognitive, not
the conative or affective categories ; it is not directly interested in the
derivation or verification of metaphysical or moral ideas, altho
questions in these fields are among the chief problems of modern
philosophy and behaviorism. Cut science, in the purer truer sense
where it borders on the fields explored by philosophy, must still
seek accuracy of information, validity of viewpoint and method.
and consider only what is logically possible and consistently demon-
strable. If we want to go farther than this we will be in the
metalogical field of philosophy and can rest assured that our post-
scientific propriety will not be offended even tho we consider that
possibly all reality is not intelligible in terms of the objective
physical, the extensive existential phase; but that perhaps it has
instead various modes of being or becoming, numerous cycles of
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function and expression which are non-rational, supra-Xature-al,
metempirical and hyper-categorical (truly transcendent conditions
indeed, if actually substantial characters and not merely adjectival
predications).
If the real Universe is non-moral owing to the moral realm being
a peculiarly human category, then we cannot say that it is confined
to moral purposes or arrangements, but that its ends are independent
of qualification as to good and bad, worthy or delinquent, efficient
or extravagant devices and procedure. Human nature then would
be oiilv one of the numerous types of nature which might variously
experience and interpret the great spectacle of the real Universe; at
least the one would be as philosophically unique and significant as
the other even tho otherwise cast in wholly disproportionate powers
and dimensions. Each of the members to the cosmic pluralism
could therefore have their own consistent circle of existence (and
perhaps their own peculiar sort of experience, science, philosophy,
ethics and art) independently and entirel}' of a different order from
that pursued by the human. This idea is not exactly agreeable with
the general assumptions of human science, but it opens up grand
vistas of thought and metaphysical speculation to the philosopher
who casts his visionary interest toward the numerous overworlds
beyond both human nature and human science.
The Impersonality of the Eternal \'alues
Deliberations as to whether values spring from the affective,
conative or cognitive activities assume that the whole valuistic
process is personal. This is provisional only to a methodological
selection, for a full philosophical report would have to give attention
•to those functions of value which are impersonal and of jnirely
scientific interest as well as to those \\hich are i)ersonal or
ephemeral. Personality itself is a fact, not a value: and personal
judgments of value by other people are really treated as so manv
objective facts to be considered in reaching a scientific judgment
(or permanent value) for the whole situation. Time and space are
impersonal conditions of human experience but their impersonalitv
does not militate against their being actual facts to be reckoned
with by each one of us in our individual lives. A hypothetical case
of metaphysical value is presented by man's subjection to limitation
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in reference to the duration and scope of his mental life; still it can
\k said that altho man niav not at f<rfsciit he rationally able to f'ass
beyond his limitations in the empirical tield he certainly has the
philosophical right to do so whenever he does acquire such ability.
Finite interests are behind all personal values : that is why both
are so ephemeral and incompetent of further utility or pursuit.
But cosmic "interests" (meaning purposes, destinies, laws) are
behind the eternal values : that is wh\ both are permanent and com-
petent to last forever as universal conditions or functions of reality.
Uoth these phases of value actually exist in the universe of interest,
of which human life and thought is one of the (for us) chief
factors. Thus, our readings of that value in Tactual experience
mav be personal or ephemeral in the attitude taken or purpose
served, but could just as well (were we not bent on selfish satis-
faction) be made impersonally for the more permanent sake of
keeping faith with the laws of God and Cosmos or, what would be
equally innocent tho not so directly decisive, to simply be contented
as a disinterested spectator to the cosmic drama—such specimens of
"pure mind" being indeed rare in this too personal life. The so-
called facts of life are just these selfsame readings which we value
because of their significance beyond the merely personal and ephem-
eral interests of our personal existence. We say that the full
significance and value of our interests are as much in the native
grain of reality as those aspects of it which function as objective
facts in human life. The fact of the matter is that all judgment
takes place in the universe of thought and interest which makes
up the experience of these facts, and whereas all human life aspires
to and culminates in practically exact and more or less theoreticallv
true judgments, the philosophical understanding of what this full
significance is must also consider its place and value as one of the
functions or expressions of reality. It is an eternal quest perhaps,
but it helps man to be functionally aspirant and keep his interests at
least occasionally philosophical and impersonal.
Under a strictly pragmatic interpretation it would seem that values
are neither impersonal nor eternal, that insofar as they are readings
appropriate to special finite occasions, the situations they cover are
discrete and ephemeral. But the case is only a particular one. The
pragmatic viewpoint fails to see that the same or similar situations
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are being forever repeated and that it is this continuity and in-
tegrity of a collective increment which make it possible for any
special set of values to be intelligible and communicable at all.
Judgments and distinctions of value are special and ephemeral to
the purpose of the situation which gives rise to them, but not the
values themselves, for there is a feature readable in rather than
attachable to all real values which shows them to be constitutive as
well as selective, categorical as well as adjectival. Philosophy,
science, religion, ethics and aesthetics are all systems of valuation
in their separate fields of interest, but who will attempt to argue
that the\" serve only a particular or ephemeral situation ? Thev
are both descriptive and normative procedures aiming to inspire
and discipline the human spirit, and as such will be as persistent and
immortal as the \'ery spirituelle which is at once their source and
destiny.
The meliorism of man's spirit and the world he lives in by
patterning his disciplines after the inexorable demands of cosmic
evolution is vitall}- bound up with the fact that real values like
laws, duties, ideals are impersonal and eternal, that no other
situation in life, no other sort of existence could be considered
different or better without first being analyzed and compared as
to what field of value its major characters were heuristic of, and
whether they shared in the general melioristic function which makes
life real and decisively earnest. The present situation does not have
to be perfect, but is only required to portend good tidings. It must
indicate some positive purpose or inclination toward becoming re-
surgent and transfigured, else we lose interest in it and let it go
about its perilous way alone. Permanence, iiUegrity, continuity and
intelligibility are the chief readings we make from reality, and these
are themselves among the ultimate philosophical values to be cher-
ished and codified into s\stenis of cosmic conception and under-
standing. They are among the criteria which we use everv day t(
determine what is true and what is false, what is eternal and what is
e])hemera], what is real and what is chimerical in our ceaseless con-
tact with experience.
If we understand evolution to be melioristic and progressive
from one condition to another which is intrinsically better, we imply
tiiat it is also emergent and aspirant, that when anything evolves it
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is a member of an order which is both ascendent and endogenous.
The basic assumption is telcolo>oi-"<il. lenthng aid and pivinjj sanction
to whatever else of \ aluisin and cschatology we rcciuire to bolster tht-
h>-pothesis. Qualitative differentia are compromised and reduced to
mere variations of kind, degrees of value or opportunity. Schematic
irreducibles are promiscuously taken in and given free iho vulgar
shelter under the common roof of a universalist hospitality. We
must take good care, however, that we do not slip into an extreme of
equal fallacy with Hegel's viewpoint. We must remember that there
is still some system required of our philosophy, that we imist
progress from the simple to the complex, from below upward as well
as endogenously, and that whatever tokens of reality and truth we
are able to grasp are still only parts or aspects whose full significance
in the cosmic whole must be very carefully weighed if we would be
sure of avoiding error on the side of either superlation or in-
sufficiency.
We do not have to be pragmatists to agree that all conceptions
of natural law are teleological in origin and validity. Apart from
the ends laws serve, or which we assume that they serve, there i'
no handle for our mental grasp. While not exactly utilitarian or
cast in mercenary mold, they are still purposive, regulative and in-
cumbent upon our attention to either willingly obey or seek some
sophist opportunity for evasion. We observe Nature's doings and
evolutionary procedure, and out of our experience pick such con-
nexions and homogeneities as seem to indicate the presence of laws
in Nature's admirably accurate control of worlds and things. Rut
the ascription of law, according to the humanist, i-; our own interpre-
tation of the situation, not hers: it means that we have found just
that much necessity and control in her conduct of universal affairs
—
a conclusion which, to anyone except a verbal eristic, amounts to
the same thing. If the laws we read into the program of Nature
are less in content than the facts they are supposed to regulate, it is
because our own experience and scientific derivations are selective
in attention and constitutive only of such aspects of realitv as in-
terest or concern us. This is the basis of our nomological proof
that it is not Nature but human nature which is finite and auto-
morphic.
Ordinary empirical valuism is humanistic in the sense of being
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personal rather than intrinsic ; it does not have the impersonal touch
which characterizes scientific or philosophical valuism. But in
either case the valuistic process depends upon who appraises and
what is appraised and whether their relation is harmonious or satis-
factory. The range of value may fall in either positive or negative
series according to whether this relation is agreeable or repulsive,
satisfactory or disappointive, and the significance of the values de-
rived may be either denotative of simple qualification or connotative
of complex characteristics not immediately effectual. The full
variation from zero in any direction may be as rich and extensive or
as intensive and persistent as the personal interests, prejudices, affec-
tions and aversions of the valuer ; but the ratio is determinable when-
ever we know the factors entering into both sides of the situation,
whether they be genuine or false, permanent or expedient, mercen-
ary or devout. Particular or intrinsic value implies habitual and
homogeneous factors of approach and desirability, but when any
system of particular or intrinsic values have become established and
serve as a norm in the regulation of future value-judgment then
the whole series becomes categorical and impersonal, and can then
serve as constitutive rather than as instrumental issues under cul-
tural interpretation. This manner of acquiring objective validitj' for
a system of values is permissible and constructive in other meta-
physical fields also, such as when aesthetic becomes idealistic, when
science becomes philosophical, when sociology is interpreted on
melioristic grounds, or when religious eschatology is justified as the
idealism of an aspirant spirituelle rather than as a jural submission
or themistic retribution.
The difference between logical validity and factual validity arises
from the difference between the subjective and the objective worlds.
The common practice, when not being able to objectify our own
minds as parts of the external world, is to subjectify and automor-
phose the world of experience, so that whole universes of interest,
thought, diction and fiction are constructed out of materials wholly
eisegized or at least hypostasized as having existence outside our
minds. Reality and fact exercize but little function as authoritative
patterns for our valuistic decisions in such cases. But they should,
if we intend that our science and philosophy should be significant of
any dignity and discretion at all. Real factual validity, if it means
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anything at all. means that man's experience is not wholly egoistic,
autoniorpliic. rhyoniistic nor .lutolelic, but ]>.Tttly replic.il and im-
jicrson.ll to the extent tli.Tt things indciioiulcnt of his own intellectual
process of understanding them arc of such coherence and intrinsic
order that they can be used as criteria of the things (his own ideas,
wishes or inventions, for example ) which do not enjoy such inde-
pendence. The response of objective reality to man's manipulations
might well be listed among the data of factual validity while the
consistency shared therewith by the response of man's replical values
to his institutions and cultural uses would be listed among the data
of logical validity.
.\t no point, however, do we reach complete solution and inter-
change of the subjective and objective worlds. W'c only establish
such contact and understanding as will not be too erratic for some
practical degree of empirical and rational sufficiency. All man's
causes are efficient and expedient to the vicissitudes of life, but the
L'niverse can afford to display both first and final cause? because
there is where everything finds both source and destiny. The pre-
sentation and grasp of this basic fact is just the intention of every
code of philosophical value, not that it go be\ond itself in an ambi-
tious warranty of certitude, but that it merely place some determin-
able measure on the skill and accuracy of man's mind, while at the
same time placing some determinable limit on the margin of error
which may always adjoin the context of every intellectual process
which takes readings from reality. So long as the world does not
exist as a uniform simple but as a complex and variable heterogeny,
man's analyses and interpretations of it will always be of a various
and inconstant manifold of viewpoints and attitufles. One of the
first metaphysical facts to be recognized in the situation is that this
variation and complexity is an actual external condition and that it
is only by way of adaptation, caution, scrutiny and subtle philosophy
that the human mind has thus far come to have any intelligent ex-
perience and communicable understanding of the external world at
all. This is why it is so much easier to work out sciences having
consistent schematisms of logical validity than it is to draw up even
halfway inclusive philosophical syncretisms having replical superi-
ority in factual validity. Some other scientist or philosopher with a
different variety of knowledge and experience could in a few days
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shoot holes in our Httle private hypothesis and show that it had been
somewhat dependent upon personal limitations and affections after
all. It is never safe therefore to confound the postulative with the
constitutive, the nominal with the substantive, the predicate with the
subject, the selective with the continuous, nor the ephemeral per-
sonal with the eternal real.
Facts are not values, they subsist apart from man's own uni-
verse of interest and thought and do not depend upon any item of
his attention or concern They are actually inherent conditions of
reality and in this respect differ from values which are merely
human readings and derivations from facts. Still, values themselves
may be treated as among the external objects of the valuistic pro-
cess because all judgment is a judgment of values, they being always
intermediate between the facts and our understanding of what the
facts mean. All the facts of human experience must be valued for
content and significance before they can be judged to be consistent
with and complementary to the world of fact already set up. The
universe of reality and fact contains all the manifold of possible
existence only one phase or order of which happens to be our own
universe of experience, interest and thought.
\\'e might say that if facts are the subjects of experience, values
are the predicates and judgment is the conclusion or inference.
This means that the inferential relation cannot be immediately ap-
plied to reality as it appears in factual contact with human life: it
must await the opportunity, convenience and disposition of the em-
pirical deliverance and appreciation of value-meanings. Xo one can
justl\- or philosophically "jump at conclusions" from the ground of
bare empirical presentation. No one can judge reality direct, but
must always seek out first some special field of values from which
to read significance and intention in what that special aspect of
reality means. Realit\' may well enough be intrinsic and implicit on
an absolute scale, but man's judgment of replical values is always
directive, extrinsic, descriptive and explicit. The full significance
of reality in its intensive aspect is metalogical and non-human, so
that it is only by empirical selection, intellectual translation and
logical reduction under categorical judgment that we get it into
(for us) any intelligible form at all, and it either then is, or at least
closely borders on, its factual and extensive aspect. In other words,
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wc >cck contact and experience with whatever phases of reality are
available and evaluate Unh process and data into terms of human
function, interest or utility, and then proceed to pass judgments on
how these new discoveries or value-findings fit in vAth the other
systems of fact and value which have already been challenged and
admitted to the select company of our science and philosophy. The
special validity of any particular set of value-judgments is indige-
nous to the mind making them and compatible with the field of in-
terest servetl. It is only by means of general projection, versatile
contrast and inclusive anticipation (not altogether temporal or pro-
vincial in cultural reference > that we pass on to the larger fields of
logical and moral validity. The validity which is factual or replical
comes first in the empirical sequence and is immediate, theoretical,
non-human while the validity which is logical and (or) moral, as
also ethical, jural, religious or aesthetic by various derivation and
application of purpose, is practical or pro-human.
It is quite possibly a form of the pathetic fallacy that we require
philosophy to come to grips with the particular and personal. It is
easier than standing by our strictly scientific guns and demanding
that it verify and validate our concepts of the unity, continuity,
spontaneity and general intelligibility of the Universe. We are giv-
ing ear to automorphic and decadent requests when we are urged
to read textual philosophy as that subterfuge which makes the terms
of experience intelligible and acceptable only thru a reductive proc-
ess whereby they become less in content than the facts they repre-
sent. \'alues are selective simples and are not truly replical of the
facts if the latter have been forcibly taken out of their native mag-
ma in the complex empirical stream and turned intr) humanized
forms of what is agreeable, intelligible, liveable or useful to our
private interests. It is just this automorphic personalism which is
debauching our philosophic spirituelle. and our intellectual destiny
will be a sorry mess if we do not bolster our idealistic morale with
something more philosophical than such trifling sops to a moribund
metaphysical affection. The maxim that man is the measure of all
things loses .somewhat of its smug sophistication when we remem-
ber that we never know much about man's real nature and destiny
until we have measured him alongside the great Universe of all
things, all realities, all the myriad universes of thought and dis-
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course, fiction and fact. The ultimate philosophical question is
whether man's capacity for experience and understanding is, or in
any determinable period of his evolutionary process, can be made
adequate to cover the whole field of reality and impersonal fact:
or do his (apparently permanent) finitude and immaturity, if not
his total ephemerality and insignificance, render him hopelessly im-
potent and incompetent to philosophize anything at all ?
